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Background: Infectious disease surveillance has recently seen many changes including rapid growth of informal
surveillance, acting both as competitor and a facilitator to traditional surveillance, as well as the implementation of
the revised International Health Regulations. The present study aims to compare outbreak reporting by formal and
informal sources given such changes in the field.
Methods: 111 outbreaks identified from June to December 2012 were studied using first formal source report and
first informal source report collected by HealthMap, an automated and curated aggregator of data sources for
infectious disease surveillance. The outbreak reports were compared for timeliness, reported content, and disease
severity.
Results: Formal source reports lagged behind informal source reports by a median of 1.26 days (p = 0.002). In 61%
of the outbreaks studied, the same information was reported in the initial formal and informal reports. Disease
severity had no significant effect on timeliness of reporting.
Conclusion: The findings suggest that recent changes in the field of surveillance improved formal source reporting,
particularly in the dimension of timeliness. Still, informal sources were found to report slightly faster and with
accurate information. This study emphasizes the importance of utilizing both formal and informal sources for timely
and accurate infectious disease outbreak surveillance.
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Traditional infectious disease surveillance most often re-
lies on cases recorded at healthcare facilities and diag-
nostic lab results, which are hierarchically reported to
local, state, and national health authorities [1]. Such
methods of surveillance, which historically have been
characteristic of government or government-affiliated
agencies, are prone to missing cases and time lags [1,2].
To overcome these limitations, many informal platforms,
defined as surveillance incorporating data sources out-
side of government and clinical systems, have been
developed in the last two decades. These include but are
not limited to: BioCaster, Global Public Health Intelligence
Network (GPHIN), Health Emergency Disease Information* Correspondence: chibahk@mail.harvard.edu
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unless otherwise stated.System (HEDIS), HealthMap, Medical Information System
(MedISys), Pattern-based Understanding and Learning Sys-
tem (PULS), and Program for Monitoring Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases (ProMED-Mail) [3,4].
In addition to the growth of informal surveillance plat-
forms, the World Health Organization (WHO) revised
the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005,
changing the landscape of modern infectious disease
surveillance [5-7]. The revised IHR instated a legal
framework and procedure for outbreak detection, assess-
ment, and reporting, putting pressure on government
sources to rapidly report public health events [5-7]. Spe-
cifically, the revision requires governments to develop
and maintain surveillance capacities in addition to the
existing border screening requirements, to report events
of possible concern to the WHO within 24 hours, andhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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sources for outbreak intelligence [5-7].
These combined changes fostered a narrowing gap be-
tween formal and informal surveillance. For example, as
ministries of health are building core capacities in surveil-
lance and reporting as stipulated by the IHR revisions, it is
expected that surveillance data be communicated in a
more timely and transparent fashion [5,8]. Simultaneously,
as informal surveillance efforts are growing and their
value validated, informal surveillance data is increasingly
being accessed and utilized by formal surveillance organi-
zations, also exemplified explicitly by the IHR revisions
[5,6]. As lines are blurred between formal and informal
surveillance, their characteristics may be changing as well.
For example, formal source reports have been expected
and shown to be slower than informal sources but given
greater value as the gold standard [1,8,9]. Another charac-
teristic is that for severe diseases with potential political or
economic impacts, formal source reporting may be biased
and less transparent [8,10]. It can be hypothesized that
with changes in the field, such differences between formal
and informal source reports become less distinct. To test
this hypothesis, initial outbreak reports from formal
sources and informal sources were compared in timeli-
ness, reported information, and disease severity.
Previous studies have compared timeliness between for-
mal and informal sources, but have used a historic time
frame of five to 20 years. The 2010 study by Chan et al.
studied outbreaks from 1996 to 2006 and documented a
16-day lag between first informal communication of an
outbreak and WHO Outbreak News [9]. Mondor et al. re-
ported that government sources lagged 10 days behind
non-government sources from 1996 to 2009 [1]. Tsai et al.
reported in 2013 a 4.09 day lag between ProMED-Mail and
WHO reports on avian influenza and H1N1 outbreaks be-
tween 2003 and 2009 [8]. Unlike these previous studies,
the present study analyzes a more recent and narrow time-
frame of six months in 2012, for an updated timeliness
finding that is more relevant to current biosurveillance
practices. This study also provides an additional data point
to the downward trend observed in previous studies of the
shortening time lag between formal and informal sources.
Analyzing the content of reports along with timeliness
also differentiates this study. A timely report is valuable
only with accurate information, and a later report would
be expected to contain more information as the out-
break progresses with time. While previous timeliness
studies compare initial outbreak reports, the potential
difference in content of these reports is not analyzed
[1,8,9]. In the present study, both variables are jointly
analyzed to assess the relationship between timeliness
and reported information.
Finally, outbreaks of severe diseases, which are more
likely to impact trade or travel, are thought to be mostprone to delayed reporting by formal sources due to po-
tential political and economical consequences [8,11]. To
the authors’ knowledge, no study to date has compared
the effect of disease severity on the reporting behavior of
formal and informal sources.
Methods
The present study uses data from HealthMap (www.
healthmap.org), which aggregates more than 200,000 dis-
parate data sources onto a user-friendly and freely available
interactive map [12]. Through automated online querying
every hour in fifteen different languages, followed by auto-
mated and manual filtering and tagging of Web-based re-
ports, the system facilitates real-time visualizations of
emerging public health threats [12]. A detailed description
of the system can be found elsewhere [12].
From June 1 to Dec 31, 2012, initial outbreak reports by
formal sources were manually identified through MoH+, a
HealthMap feed developed to actively gather streamlined
formal source communication. This included websites,
Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts of ministries of
health, related ministries (e.g., agriculture, rural develop-
ment), government portals, government affiliated surveil-
lance organizations (e.g., CDC, FDA), and relevant
international governing bodies (e.g., UN, WHO). The feed
was built using more than 700 RSS feeds and APIs, a
method described in a previous publication [13].
Initial outbreak reports were defined as event-based
reports for one or more cases of any infectious disease
with no reference to a related previous outbreak.
These outbreak reports were manually matched in in-
formal sources using the HealthMap feeds described in
Table 1. Outbreaks were matched by searching for the
disease and country of outbreak and reviewing result-
ing HealthMap informal reports. These informal re-
ports may be utilized by formal sources (for example,
Google News reports could be utilized by government
agencies) or be drawn from a formal source (ProMED
report relays a government statement). For the pur-
poses of comparing formal and informal initial reports
within HealthMap, the definition of a formal source
report was that collected by MoH+. If formal outbreak
information was collected through an informal Health-
Map feed rather than through MoH+ which was spe-
cifically designed to pick up official reports, this points
to the disseminative feature of the informal source
report.
Of 170 unique initial outbreak reports in MoH+ dur-
ing the study period, 111 (65.3%) were also reported by
the informal feeds in Table 1. The 34.7% of outbreaks
not reported by informal sources are a topic of interest
in itself but were not the focus of the present study. The
111 outbreaks, with both a first formal report and a first
informal report, constituted the final sample for analysis.
Table 1 HealthMap feeds of informal source outbreak reports
Feed Description
Google News A commercial news aggregation service provided by Google
Arabic RSS Feeds Aggregation of news media in the Arabic language
Wildlife Data Integration Network A news feed from the Global Wildlife Disease News Map provided by the NBII-Wildlife Disease Information Node
at the US Geological Survey
Baidu A Chinese language commercial news aggregation service provided by Baidu, the number 1 search engine in China
Soso A Chinese language commercial news aggregation service provided by the Chinese search engine Soso
ProMED Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases
HM Community Online articles or reports submitted by community members through the HealthMap website
Eyewitness Reports Approved alerts made by community members through HealthMap’s Outbreaks Near Me mobile application
(healthmap.org/outbreaksnearme)
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reporting seven cases of Legionnaires disease in Stoke-
on-Trent, UK on July 24 2012 11:47 AM, and the UK
Health Protection Agency reporting seven cases of Le-
gionnaires’ disease in Stoke-on-Trent, UK on the same
day 12:18 PM. Another typical example is a Marburg
outbreak in Kibale, Uganda, a local news site reporting
two cases on October 19 and the WHO reporting three
cases on October 21.
For each outbreak, the issued date and time (standard-
ized to Eastern Standard Time) of first report from
MoH+ and from the informal source were identified,
and the difference between the two was defined as the
time lag. Following convention, the time lag was mea-
sured in terms of MoH+ lagging behind informal
sources, with a positive lag signifying slower reporting
by formal sources. To test for a significant difference in
timeliness, the Wilcoxon sign rank test was performed
to test the null hypothesis of no lag (0 seconds).
The content of each pair of first reports was manually
reviewed and placed into the following categories: less
information in MoH+ report, same information in both
sources, or more information in MoH+ report. Most
often, “more information” meant a higher case count or
laboratory-confirmed cases rather than suspected cases,
which were later verified to be accurate with subsequent
reports. In the scenario of complete merging of formal
and informal surveillance, the pair of initial reports
would report the same information at the same time.
The qualitative assessment of the information reported
was intended to study the deviation from this scenario.
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to test for sig-
nificant difference in timeliness by information category.
Finally, to assess the effect of disease severity on time-
liness and reported information, HealthMap’s disease se-
verity scale of 1 to 5 was used. This scale measures the
potential impact of the disease in social, economic, and
political dimensions, with lower categories for routine
and lower burden diseases and higher categories for verycontagious, fatal, or high economic impact diseases. It was
developed by a team of HealthMap analysts with extensive
clinical, public health, and curation experience, well before
this research was conducted. Although subjective and yet
to be robustly validated, the majority of the US, UK, and
Canadian notifiable diseases as well as the CDC Bioterror-
ism and Global Early Warning System’s priority diseases
are 4’s and 5’s on the HealthMap disease severity scale
(53%, 71%, 61%, 68%, and 74% respectively), suggesting
that the scale mirrors potential severity of these diseases’
outbreaks. In the absence of an externally validated disease
severity scale, this internal scale was used. The Kruskal-
Wallis test was performed to test for significant difference
in timeliness by disease severity category, and Fisher’s
exact test was performed to test for association between
reported information and disease severity.
Results
Outbreak reports by formal sources lagged a median of
1.26 days (30.28 hours, p = 0.002). The full distribution can
be seen in Figure 1. Of all outbreaks, 70% were reported
first by informal sources and 30% first by formal sources.
For 30% of outbreaks, first formal and informal reports
were within 24 hours of each other. There were 20 out-
breaks (18%) for which formal sources reported 24 hours
or more before informal sources—10 by national, 9 by re-
gional, 1 by international government sources. The major-
ity of outbreaks (57%) fell in the 0 to 10 day lag category.
For 68 outbreaks (61%), there was “same information”
in the first formal and informal reports. Among the 68,
there was a significant lag (p = 0.003) in the timeliness of
formal sources. Therefore, a majority of the time, formal
sources lagged behind informal sources while reporting
the same information. In the remaining 39% of out-
breaks, formal sources reported more information in
22% and less information in 17%.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between timeliness and
reported information; the time lag was longest when the
initial formal report provided more information (median
Figure 1 Distribution of time lag in days (n = 107*) *excludes 4 points: −99, −98, 118, 130 days.
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where MoH+ provides less or same information, the me-
dian lag was −0.21 and 0.85 days respectively (significant
only in the same information category). Furthermore, the
lag was significantly different among the three informationFigure 2 Distribution of time lag vs information reported.categories (p = 0.0001), confirming the graphical trend
that formal sources provide more information when they
report later.
Taken together, the general trend for 89 outbreaks
(80%) was two-pronged. In 59 (53%) of total outbreaks,
Bahk et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:135 Page 5 of 6reports from formal and informal sources reflect natural
progression of the outbreak – formal and informal re-
ports were published within 24 hours and contained
same information, or if a formal report was available
earlier by more than 24 hours, it contained less informa-
tion and vice versa. In 30 outbreaks (27%), same infor-
mation was reported between 1 to 51 days (median of
4.5 days) later by formal reports, as is conventionally ex-
plained by formal sources’ need for confirmation or
buearocratic requirements.
The remaining were outbreaks that do not follow this
trend. These included ten (9%) outbreaks for which for-
mal sources reported on the same day or later with less
information, possibly indicating that government agen-
cies are not fully utilizing resources available to share
outbreak information with the public – although there
may be valid reasons for witholding outbreak informa-
tion, discussed below. Another 12 outbreaks (11%) were
reported faster by formal sources and contained the
same information, indicating government agencies have
surveillance systems in place that ensure timely detec-
tion and reporting of disease.
In looking at disease severity, although the average se-
verity was lower in outbreaks for which formal sources
reported faster (3.58 versus 3.68), this observation did
not pass the significance bar (p = 0.15).
Discussion
The present study showed that from June to December
2012, HealthMap reports of formal sources lagged an
average of 1.26 days behind informal sources, while the
pairs of initial reports mostly reported the same informa-
tion. This delay may stem from a desire to provide con-
firmed information or due to bureaucratic requirements.
These findings suggest that informal sources provide early
and accurate outbreak information, but also that formal
sources have improved in speed and transparency com-
pared to previous studies. These results also point to the
closing gap between formal and informal sources, with
majority of the pairs of initial reports containing the same
information and the time lag continuously shortening.
Especially notable was the improved timeliness of for-
mal sources compared to earlier studies reporting 16-day,
10-day, and 4-day lags and the continuous trend of short-
ening time lag [1,8,9]. Disease severity did not significantly
impact relative timeliness of reporting, suggesting trans-
parency in reporting diseases that may have political or
economic impacts. Multiple factors may explain these
findings, such as formal agencies’ increased adoption of
online and streamlined communication, growth of infor-
mal surveillance as a competing source of information, or
the 2005 IHR revision, which mandated and supported
countries to practice more standardized formal surveil-
lance and reporting.Another possibility and a limitation of this study is
that a system like MoH+ captures a distinct subset of
formal sources that are more timely than formal sources
overall, by being limited to formal sources that report
online, are in a HealthMap-supported language, and
have RSS feeds. Additionally, any online communication
from a government-affiliated entity was included as a
formal source report in MoH+, and a more restrictive
definition of formal source reports could have been
used. Nevertheless, the results suggest reporting online
in a commonly supported language and using tools like
RSS feeds and social media may allow formal surveil-
lance organizations to disseminate reports faster through
informal platforms like MoH+. Overall, these explana-
tions point to the importance of collaboration between
formal and informal surveillance systems to enable rapid
dissemination of outbreak data.
Beyond timeliness, review of the reported information
confirmed informal sources as a credible source of out-
break information. A pattern seen repeatedly was an
outbreak report by an informal source (e.g. online news)
followed by a formal source (e.g. the ministry) report the
next day, or an informal source report of suspected cases
versus a delayed formal source report of lab-confirmed
cases. Disease severity analysis was inconclusive, suggest-
ing formal source reporting was not delayed by disease
severity in this dataset. Limitations in the content and
disease severity analyses, respectively, were the use of
the three content categories (less, same, and more infor-
mation) making the study unable to capture more
granular differences in information, and lack of a ro-
bustly validated disease severity scale. It would also be of
interest to categorize reports further beyond formal and
informal in future studies, to better characterize timeli-
ness and content in specific types of sources.
Another limitation is the selected study outcomes –
timeliness and content as often measured by case count –
in that they may overlook other complexities in outbreak
reporting, especially when looking only at the initial re-
ports. However, it is reasonable that both timeliness and
accurate case counts, albeit simplistic, are positive charac-
teristics in outbreak reporting worthy of analysis over a
large sample of outbreaks.
Conclusion
This study showed that formal sources have improved in
outbreak reporting practices, mainly in the dimension of
timeliness. Informal sources, however, continue to pro-
vide insights slightly faster, most often reporting the
same information as formal sources. These findings il-
lustrate the merging of informal and formal surveillance,
in that formal and informal sources are most often
reporting the same information in closer time proximity
than ever before.
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global context is that formal and informal surveillance
can complement each other for more rapid and accurate
outbreak reporting. The key for timely and accurate
disease surveillance is not in relying on one type of
source, but utilizing all possible sources in a way that is
digestible to various stakeholders. With formal sources
offering reliable, gold standard data from indicator based
surveillance, and informal sources proactively collecting
and disseminating event-based surveillance information,
timely and accurate reporting can be achieved with
existing tools.
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